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GREENFIELD OR ACQUISITION ENTRY: 
A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENT MODE 
LITERATURE 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the empirical literature on the determinants of the choice by multinational 
enterprises between entering foreign countries through greenfields or acquisitions. We discuss 
and compare the main theoretical perspectives used, provide a detailed overview of the empirical 
findings, examine why these findings have often been inconsistent, and offer theoretical and 
methodological suggestions to guide future research. 
 
Keywords: greenfield, acquisition, establishment mode choice, review 
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1. Introduction 
Internationalizing firms can enter foreign countries through different entry modes, ranging 
from contractual modes such as direct exports and licensing, to equity modes such as greenfield 
joint ventures (JVs) and full acquisitions. The choice of foreign entry mode is one of the core 
topics in international management research (Werner, 2002), with many studies examining the ex 
ante determinants or the ex post performance implications of a firm’s choice between certain 
modes, notably that between (i) contractual and equity modes, (ii) JVs and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries (WOSs) (for a review, see Brouthers and Hennart, 2007), and (iii) greenfield 
investments and acquisitions. In this paper we review the empirical literature on the determinants 
of the latter choice, the so-called foreign establishment mode choice (Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995)1. Following Wilson’s (1980) exploratory study, this literature has examined the 
determinants of the choice between greenfield and acquisition entry from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives and in different empirical settings, thereby often obtaining inconsistent findings. For 
example, only six of the 22 independent variables included in multiple studies have been found 
to have a consistent significant effect on the choice of establishment mode. Given the variety of 
theoretical perspectives used and the many inconsistent findings obtained by the empirical 
literature, we think it is important to review this literature, so as to (1) gain insight into the main 
theoretical perspectives used and the empirical findings obtained, (2) uncover why these findings 
have often been inconsistent, and (3) make theoretical and methodological recommendations to 
push establishment mode research forward. Our review complements Shimizu et al.’s (2004) 
excellent survey of the extant theoretical perspectives on cross-border acquisitions, in that we 
                                                           
1
 We thus exclude from our review purely theoretical contributions and modeling efforts (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 
1998; Görg, 2000), as well as studies on the comparative performance (e.g., Li, 1995) and regional location (e.g., 
O’Huallachain and Reid, 1997) of greenfields and acquisitions. 
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examine in closer detail the perspective of acquisitions as an alternative to greenfield 
investments in foreign markets. 
In the next section we introduce the empirical literature on the determinants of an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice, and identify a subset of studies whose arguments and empirical 
findings can be meaningfully compared. We then sketch and compare the most important 
theoretical perspectives used by these comparable studies, and report on their empirical findings. 
We then discuss two possible reasons why these findings have been inconsistent, viz. the 
existence of unrecognized moderating effects and research-design related problems. We close 
with theoretical and methodological recommendations for future research. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Empirical studies 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) can establish operations abroad through greenfield 
investments and through acquisitions. Making a greenfield investment means building a new 
subsidiary from scratch. The subsidiary can either be a WOS of the MNE, or a JV co-owned by a 
partner with complementary assets (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). Making an acquisition, on 
the other hand, means purchasing part or all of the equity of an existing firm (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998; Larimo, 2003), implying that acquisitions can be partially and wholly owned 
as well. The price paid by the acquirer usually consists of the target’s estimated going-concern 
value plus a takeover premium (Pennings et al., 1994; Caves, 1996). This premium is often much 
higher in cross-border deals than in domestic ones, presumably because international acquirers 
generally have less knowledge of the true value of their targets than domestic acquirers (Harris 
and Ravenscraft, 1991; Inkpen et al., 2000). 
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Through an extensive keyword search in ABI/Inform Global and our knowledge of other 
studies in the field, we found 23 empirical studies on the determinants of the choice between 
greenfield and acquisition entry. However, while most of the literature considers this choice to be 
independent from that between JV and WOS (e.g., Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart, 1991; 
Hennart and Park, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995, 2005; Brouthers and Hennart, 
2007), six of these 23 studies consider the two choices to be interrelated, thus making it difficult 
to compare the arguments and findings of these six studies to those of the other ones. We 
therefore exclude from the remainder of our review: (a) Kogut and Singh (1988), Anand and 
Delios (1997), and Chang and Rosenzweig (2001), who examine the choice between acquisitions 
(full and partial ones), greenfield JVs, and wholly-owned greenfields; (b) Shaver (1998), who 
distinguishes between the same three entry modes, but excludes greenfield JVs; (c) Hennart and 
Reddy (1997), who analyze the choice between greenfield JVs and full acquisitions; and (d) 
Meyer (1998), who distinguishes between wholly-owned greenfields, greenfield JVs, partial 
acquisitions, and full acquisitions, and examines what factors make MNEs prefer each of these 
entry modes over the other three. We also exclude Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) because their 
sample includes domestic subsidiaries, and Anand and Delios (2002) because their analysis is at 
the industry rather than at the subsidiary level. These exclusions leave us with 15 studies whose 
arguments and findings can be meaningfully compared, thus enabling us to examine why these 
findings have often been inconsistent. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of these 15 
studies. 
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2.2. Theoretical perspectives and their predictions 
Foreign market entry involves an MNE parent that establishes a subsidiary in a specific 
industry in a specific foreign country, indicating that establishment mode choices play 
themselves out at the parent, subsidiary, industry, and country level. Hence, a full understanding 
of the determinants of such choices requires theoretical perspectives that focus on these four 
levels. As we will show below, the perspectives most often used by the 15 selected studies 
typically focus on only one or two of these levels, leading most studies to rely on multiple 
perspectives complementing one another at least partly. As Table 1 shows, the most often-used 
perspectives are transaction cost/internalization theory, the organizational learning perspective, 
information economics, the theory of the growth of the firm, the industrial organization 
perspective, and institutional theory2. Below we discuss and compare these perspectives and their 
most important predictions regarding the choice of establishment mode. 
2.2.1. Transaction cost/internalization theory 
Table 1 shows that the dominant theory used to explain an MNE’s establishment mode choice 
is transaction cost/internalization theory, one of the core international business theories 
developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), Rugman (1981), and Hennart (1982). Like 
Williamson’s (1975, 1985) version of transaction cost theory, transaction cost/internalization 
theory originally focused on the comparative costs of exchanging intermediate inputs through 
market transactions and internalizing the markets for these inputs. But in contrast to Williamson, 
who focuses on how asset specificity and uncertainty determine the choice between market 
exchange and internalization, transaction cost/internalization scholars put more emphasis on how 
the bounded rationality of actors lowers the efficiency of the markets for certain inputs, forcing 
MNEs to sometimes internalize these markets. If an input has a large tacit component, a potential 
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foreign buyer, being limitedly rational, will be unable to determine its exact characteristics, and 
will hence be unwilling to pay its full value. If the seller would reveal these characteristics to the 
buyer to obtain a fair price, the latter would obtain the input for free, and could behave 
opportunistically by refusing to pay afterwards (Arrow, 1962). This problem can be avoided by 
aligning the incentives of the seller and the foreign buyer. This alignment is most efficiently 
achieved by internalizing the market for the input, i.e. by organizing the transaction within a 
MNE (Hennart, 1982; 2000). 
Although originally used to explain the choice by MNEs between exchanging inputs through 
market-like arrangements such as licensing and internalizing the markets for these inputs through 
foreign investment, transaction cost/internalization theory has been extended to explain the 
choice between JVs and WOSs (e.g., Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1988, 1991), and 
that between greenfields and acquisitions (e.g., Hennart and Park, 1993). This extended 
transaction cost/internalization perspective contends that an MNE’s choice between greenfields 
and acquisitions depends on a comparison of the costs associated with exploiting or obtaining 
intermediate inputs abroad through these two establishment modes.  
One input that MNEs may want to exploit or obtain abroad is firm-embedded technological 
knowledge, which is often tacit and hence costly to exchange through the market (Hennart, 
1982). MNEs that possess this type of knowledge may want to exploit it abroad to realize 
economies of scale or scope in R&D or production. The transaction costs associated with 
exploiting such knowledge through greenfield investments are generally lower than those 
associated with exploiting it through acquisitions, as greenfields enable MNEs to install their 
technologies from the outset and to transfer the accompanying skills to a carefully-selected 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2
 All these perspectives have been used by at least two of the 15 selected studies. 
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workforce capable of and willing to absorb them (Hennart and Park, 1993)3. MNEs that lack 
proprietary technological knowledge, on the other hand, may be motivated to obtain it to 
improve their competitive position. Since such knowledge is time-consuming and costly to 
develop internally (Wernerfelt, 1984), and difficult to purchase on the market because of its 
generally tacit nature and its embeddedness in firms, it is most efficiently obtained through 
cross-border acquisitions (Hennart et al., 1996; Larimo, 2003). Hence, whereas MNEs with 
abundant firm-embedded technological knowledge are likely to choose greenfields, those lacking 
such knowledge are likely to choose acquisitions.  
Two other assets that are often tacit are knowledge of how to successfully operate 
internationally and in particular host countries (Hennart, 1982). Such knowledge is to a large 
extent experiential, meaning that it is primarily developed through experience (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). MNEs with limited international or host-country experience will thus lack this 
knowledge and, given its tacitness, will find it costly to purchase it on the market in disembodied 
form, i.e. separately from its owner. Such inexperienced MNEs are therefore likely to make 
acquisitions to efficiently gain access to the required knowledge, while those with extensive 
international or host-country experience are likely to choose greenfields, as they already possess 
this knowledge (Hennart and Park, 1993; Caves, 1996; Larimo, 2003). 
A similar line of reasoning holds for product-specific knowledge, i.e. knowledge of how to 
manufacture particular products. Such knowledge is also experiential and largely tacit, and hence 
costly to develop internally or to purchase on the market in disembodied form. MNEs that 
expand abroad to manufacture products which are very different from those manufactured at 
home generally lack the knowledge required to manufacture such products and should hence 
                                                           
3
 This advantage of greenfields over acquisitions may be smaller for greenfield JVs with a strong local partner 
because such a partner may be less receptive to the MNE’s technology. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising 
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prefer to make acquisitions, as this is the most efficient way to obtain this tacit experiential 
knowledge. MNEs expanding abroad to manufacture products that are closely related or the same 
as those manufactured at home, on the other hand, already possess most or all of the required 
knowledge and are hence more likely to choose greenfields (Hennart and Park, 1993; Caves, 
1996). 
Another prediction of the modified version of transaction cost/internalization theory is that 
widely-diversified MNEs prefer acquisitions over greenfields, as the main advantage of such 
MNEs consists of advanced management control systems based on output control that reduce the 
incremental costs of making and managing acquisitions (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Zejan, 1990; 
Hennart and Park, 1993). MNEs operating in a limited number of industries, on the other hand, 
do not possess such skills and are therefore more inclined to make greenfield investments 
(Larimo, 2003). 
Finally, several studies have used the extended version of transaction cost/internalization 
theory to argue that an MNE’s establishment mode choice is affected by cultural distance, 
defined as the extent to which the shared values in one country differ from those in another 
(Hofstede, 2001). The larger the cultural distance to a country, the more costly it is for MNEs to 
transfer intangible assets such as organizational and managerial practices to subsidiaries located 
in that country (Hennart, 2000). However, this increase in costs is likely to differ between 
greenfield and acquired subsidiaries. The costs of transferring practices to acquired subsidiaries 
increase substantially with cultural distance, because such subsidiaries come with employees 
who are used to different practices (Hennart and Park, 1993). The larger the cultural distance, the 
less familiar and comfortable these employees will be with the practices of their MNE acquirer, 
and hence the more difficult it will be for MNEs to successfully install their practices in acquired 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
this point. 
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subsidiaries (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Larimo, 2003). The costs of transferring intangibles 
to greenfield subsidiaries, on the other hand, will hardly increase with cultural distance, because 
MNEs can staff such subsidiaries with fresh employees who are not yet used to any practices and 
hence more willing to accept those of the MNE (e.g., Hennart et al., 1996; Larimo, 2003). An 
MNE’s preference for greenfields over acquisitions should therefore increase with the cultural 
distance to the target country (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Larimo, 2003). 
2.2.2. The organizational learning perspective 
In the last decade, several scholars (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999) have started to look at an MNE’s establishment mode 
choice from an organizational learning perspective. This perspective postulates that firms 
operating in many different settings are exposed to a wide variety of events and ideas that 
strengthen their knowledge base and technological capabilities (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 
1991; March, 1991). Based on this idea, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) argue that MNEs 
operating in many countries are likely to have learned a broad range of technological skills and 
that such internationally-experienced MNEs therefore tend to abstain from cross-border 
acquisitions, as such acquisitions would be unlikely to provide them with additional 
technological skills4. Internationally-experienced MNEs are thus expected to have a clear 
preference for greenfield investments – a prediction in line with that of the extended transaction 
cost/internalization perspective. 
Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) apply a similar line of 
reasoning to MNEs operating in a variety of industries (i.e., product-diversified MNEs). Such 
MNEs are also likely to have learned many technological skills and should therefore prefer 
                                                           
4
 Note that Barkema and Vermeulen argue that international experience results in technological skills and not in 
knowledge of foreign markets, as the Uppsala internationalization model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) proposes. 
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greenfields to acquisitions as well. However, while Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) argue that this 
should be the case at any level of product diversity, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) suggest that 
if the number of industries in which the MNE operates becomes very large, its preference for 
greenfields changes into one for acquisitions. The reason they put forward is that the senior 
management of widely-diversified MNEs is no longer capable of comprehending all events and 
ideas to which their firms are exposed, leading them to change their firms’ structure into an M-
form. Because it is difficult to transfer knowledge between the loosely-connected divisions of an 
M-form firm (Szulanski, 1996), this change in structure constrains intra-organizational learning, 
and results in fewer technological capabilities and hence a higher likelihood of acquisitions. 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) thus predict an inverted U-shaped relationship between an 
MNE’s level of product diversity and its preference for greenfields. 
Cho and Padmanabhan (1999) identify two other important sources of learning that affect an 
MNE’s establishment mode choice, i.e. (i) its experience with greenfields and (ii) its experience 
with acquisitions. They argue that MNEs with much experience with one of these establishment 
modes are likely to use that same mode for future expansions as well, as such MNEs have 
learned over time how to effectively manage it5.   
2.2.3. Information economics 
Several studies have used insights from information economics to explain an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice (Hennart and Park, 1993; Hennart et al., 1996). Information 
economics studies how information affects economic decisions by focusing on the existence of 
information asymmetries (Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970). Such asymmetries are typically present 
in acquisitions, in that acquirers often have incomplete information on the value and culture of 
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their targets. As a result, acquirers may find it difficult to evaluate these targets ex ante (the 
inspection problem) or to integrate them in their corporate network after the deal has been 
completed (the interaction problem) (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). This information 
asymmetry is likely to be especially large for MNEs with little host-country experience. The 
reason is that such MNEs are typically unfamiliar with existing local firms and will hence find it 
very difficult to evaluate and integrate these firms, leading them to opt for greenfields instead. 
MNEs with extensive experience of a particular country, on the other hand, will be better able to 
evaluate potential takeover targets located in that country and will be more familiar with their 
culture, making these MNEs more likely to choose acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993; 
Hennart et al., 1996).     
Likewise, MNEs expanding into unrelated foreign industries are likely to face a larger 
information asymmetry in making acquisitions than those expanding in their main line of 
business. MNEs expanding into unrelated industries, intending to manufacture products different 
from those manufactured at home will be unfamiliar with the firms operating in these industries, 
whereas MNEs expanding in their main line of business, intending to manufacture the same 
products as at home, will be quite familiar with the firms in that business. Consequently, MNEs 
expanding in their main business should be more likely to make acquisitions than those 
expanding into new industries (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
2.2.4. The theory of the growth of the firm 
The theory of the growth of the firm (Penrose, 1959) forms one of the bases for the resource-
based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and attributes the growth of firms to their internal 
processes. One of its claims is that firms are constrained in their growth because they can recruit 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5
 Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) acknowledge that MNEs may also opt for the same establishment mode because 
they have become isomorphic, copying their past behavior, and not necessarily because they have learned from past 
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and train only a limited number of new managers in a given time period. This constraint mainly 
applies to growth through greenfield investments, since acquisitions come with their own 
managers. The larger a subsidiary, the larger the number of managers required to run it, and 
hence the less likely that its MNE parent has the capacity to recruit and train these managers 
itself. Consequently, subsidiaries that are relatively large compared to their parents are likely to 
have been acquired rather than built from scratch (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 
1993). Small subsidiaries on the other hand, which are often established to obtain a foothold in a 
market, require relatively few managerial resources and are hence more likely to have been 
greenfields. 
2.2.5. The industrial organization perspective 
Several studies (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Zejan, 1990; Hennart and Park, 1993; Meyer and 
Estrin, 1997) have used the industrial organization literature (e.g., Oster, 1990) to argue that an 
MNE’s establishment mode choice is influenced by the conditions in the foreign industry 
entered. One major difference between greenfield and acquisition entry is that the former 
increases local supply. This increase in supply associated with greenfields would be especially 
large in concentrated industries, as greenfield entrants would need to enter such industries at a 
large scale in order to be able to compete with the few large incumbents. However, such large-
scale greenfield entry would result in a large decrease in prices and profits and hence in a 
competitive response from incumbents. MNEs will therefore prefer to enter concentrated 
industries through acquisitions, so as to avoid increases in supply and hence retaliation by 
incumbents (Caves and Mehra, 1986). However, this assumes that host governments allow 
acquisitions. In practice governments may oppose acquisitions in concentrated industries in order 
to keep MNEs from dominating the industry and from capitalizing on the low level of 
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competition (Hennart and Park, 1993). This may force MNEs to enter concentrated industries 
through greenfield investments after all. 
Incumbents are also more likely to respond to greenfield entry if an industry is growing 
slowly, as they will lose market share in this case. MNEs will therefore prefer to enter slow-
growth industries through acquisitions. If an industry is growing rapidly, on the other hand, 
greenfield entry will not cause incumbents to lose market share and will hence be more tolerable 
for them, making such entry more likely (Zejan, 1990). However, greenfield subsidiaries take 
time to become operational, and this delay may result in high foregone profits if an industry is 
growing very rapidly (Caves and Mehra, 1986). This suggests that MNEs will opt for 
acquisitions rather than greenfields if an industry is either growing very slowly (so as to avoid 
retaliation by incumbents) or very rapidly (so as to avoid foregone profits) (Caves and Mehra, 
1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). 
A final characteristic of the industry entered that may strongly affect an MNE’s establishment 
mode choice is the availability of suitable local takeover targets (e.g., Caves and Mehra, 1986; 
Zejan, 1990; Larimo, 2003). When such targets are lacking, as is often the case in infant 
industries or small countries (Caves, 1996), MNEs are also forced to enter through greenfields. 
2.2.6. Institutional theory 
Institutional theory claims that firms tend to conform to the rules and norms prevailing in their 
environment in order to gain legitimacy and survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Scholars 
applying this theory to the MNE have argued that subsidiaries of MNEs experience conformity 
pressures from both their internal (parent) and external (host country) environments (Rosenzweig 
and Singh, 1991; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), i.e. pressures for global integration and local 
responsiveness (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Harzing (2002) uses these ideas to explain the impact 
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of an MNE’s international strategy on its choice of establishment mode. She argues that 
subsidiaries of MNEs following a global strategy are subject to strong pressures for internal 
conformity, while those of MNEs following a multidomestic strategy are exposed to strong 
pressures for external conformity. According to her, internal conformity is easier to realize 
through greenfields because they allow an MNE’s resources to be deployed from the outset, 
while external conformity is easier to achieve through acquisitions because they are local firms 
already embedded in the host-country environment. As a result, MNEs following a global 
strategy are likely to prefer greenfields, and those following a multidomestic one acquisitions. 
2.2.7. Summary and comparison 
Table 2 summarizes the main predictions of the six dominant theoretical perspectives used by 
the empirical literature. Although these predictions refer to parent, subsidiary, industry, as well 
as country-level determinants of establishment mode choices, the table clearly shows that most 
perspectives tend to focus on the parent and subsidiary levels, i.e. the firm level. Transaction 
cost/internalization theory is the only perspective identifying a country-level determinant (i.e., 
cultural distance), while the industrial organization literature is the only perspective focusing on 
industry-level factors. However, as we will show below, other country-level factors besides 
cultural distance may also affect establishment mode choices, and hence need to be taken into 
account in empirical analyses. Because of its focus on industry-level determinants, the industrial 
organization literature constitutes an excellent complement to the other five perspectives 
predominantly or exclusively focusing on the firm level. 
All five firm-level perspectives agree that an MNE’s resources and capabilities play a central 
role in its establishment mode choice. Establishment mode studies applying the extended 
transaction cost/internalization perspective argue that MNEs choose between greenfields and 
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acquisitions on the basis of the type of capabilities they own and the sort of complementary 
capabilities they seek. While MNEs exploiting firm-embedded technological knowledge are 
more likely to opt for greenfields because this is the most efficient way to transfer such 
knowledge, diversified MNEs exploiting management control skills will choose acquisitions 
because these skills reduce the cost of making and managing acquisitions. MNEs lacking host-
country or industry-specific knowledge are more likely to choose acquisitions to efficiently 
obtain this tacit knowledge, and can thus be considered to be resource or strategic asset seekers 
(Dunning, 1993).  
Resources also play a central role in establishment mode studies that have applied the theory 
of the growth of the firm. The main prediction of these studies, viz. that relatively large 
subsidiaries are more likely to have been acquired, is based on the assumption that MNEs short 
of managerial resources are likely to make acquisitions to obtain such resources, while those 
with sufficient resources will exploit them abroad through greenfields. In terms of Dunning’s 
(1993) motives for foreign expansion, MNEs short of managerial resources can thus be 
considered to be resource seekers as well. As explained above, establishment mode scholars 
using transaction cost theory also pay attention to managerial resources, but distinguish between 
different types of such resources. They argue that MNEs run by managers with substantial 
experience of a particular country are more likely to opt for greenfields, while those run by 
managers with advanced management control skills are more likely to make acquisitions. 
As shown in Table 2, both transaction cost/internalization theory and the organizational 
learning perspective predict that internationally-experienced MNEs prefer greenfield entry. Yet, 
the logic behind both perspectives is quite different. Like establishment mode scholars using the 
theory of the growth of the firm, those relying on the organizational learning perspective do not 
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distinguish between the different types of capabilities held or sought by MNEs, and hence do not 
consider the possibility that these different types of capabilities affect establishment mode 
choices in different ways. Organizational learning scholars argue that both product diversity, 
either at all levels (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995) or up to a certain point (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998), and international diversity endow MNEs with many technological skills, 
leading them to exploit these skills through greenfields. In contrast, transaction 
cost/internalization proponents distinguish between different types of knowledge that accrue 
through international and product diversity: international diversity results in knowledge of how 
to operate internationally, thereby reducing the need to make acquisitions and hence encouraging 
greenfield entry, while product diversity yields management control skills, which are most 
efficiently exploited through acquisitions. 
Table 2 also shows that the main predictions of information economics oppose those of 
transaction cost/internalization theory. These opposing predictions arise because establishment 
mode scholars drawing on information economics focus exclusively on the capabilities needed to 
evaluate and integrate acquisitions, while those applying transaction cost/internalization theory 
also emphasize the capabilities needed to set up and manage greenfield subsidiaries. For 
example, establishment mode scholars using information economics argue that MNEs with little 
host-country experience lack the knowledge to evaluate and integrate existing local firms, 
leading such MNEs to choose greenfields. Establishment mode scholars applying transaction 
cost theory, on the other hand, suggests that MNEs with little experience of a particular country 
will find greenfield investments in such countries even costlier because such MNEs lack the 
capabilities to successfully run a business there. They predict that these MNEs will prefer 
acquisitions to obtain these tacit capabilities. 
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While couched in different terms, the logic behind the prediction of institutional theory that 
MNEs following global strategies will prefer greenfields and those following multidomestic ones 
acquisitions bears resemblance to transaction cost/internalization reasoning. This is because 
MNEs striving for internal conformity, i.e. those with a global strategy, typically possess 
substantial firm-embedded tacit knowledge of how to manufacture technologically-advanced 
products that require little local adaptation. In line with institutional theory, transaction 
cost/internalization theory predicts that such MNEs will prefer to expand abroad through 
greenfields because this is the most efficient way to exploit firm-embedded technological 
knowledge, and because MNEs with global strategies do not need to obtain intimate knowledge 
of local consumer preferences through the acquisition of local firms. MNEs exposed to strong 
pressures for external conformity, on the other hand, i.e. those following a multidomestic 
strategy, do require such market knowledge, which, according to transaction cost/internalization 
theory, will lead them to expand abroad through acquisitions6. 
 The above discussion makes clear that the main theoretical perspectives used by the 
establishment mode literature sometimes advance opposing predictions. Table 2 shows that for 
five variables – i.e., the parent’s host-country experience, the relatedness of the subsidiary’s 
products to those of its parent, the parent’s degree of product diversity, and the concentration 
level and growth rate of the industry entered – the perspectives contradict one another. The 
predictions for the latter three variables are even mixed within their own underlying perspectives, 
with organizational learning scholars predicting both negative and inverted U-shaped effects of 
the parent’s degree of product diversity on its propensity to acquire, and industrial organization 
scholars predicting both positive and negative effects of an industry’s concentration level and 
both negative and inverted U-shaped effects of an industry’s growth rate. In the next section we 
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 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this link between transaction cost and institutional theory. 
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examine the extent to which the predictions of the dominant theories are supported by empirical 
findings. 
2.3. Empirical findings 
Table 3 provides a detailed overview of the empirical findings of the 15 comparable studies 
included in our review, with explanatory variables grouped into parent, subsidiary, industry, and 
country-level ones7. It shows that each study has entered a different set of variables and that 
findings have often been inconsistent (Shimizu et al., 2004), with some studies finding that a 
specific variable has a positive effect on an MNE’s propensity to acquire, others finding that it 
has a negative effect, and still others that is has a non-linear or non-significant effect. In fact, 
only six of the 22 variables that have been included in more than one study have fully consistent 
significant effects, and only five of these 22 variables have reasonably consistent effects across 
six or more studies. These five variables are the parent’s R&D intensity, the subsidiary’s relative 
size, the growth rate of the industry entered, the per capita income of the host country, and the 
year in which an entry took place. 
In line with transaction cost/internalization theory, R&D-intensive MNEs – i.e., MNEs with a 
high R&D expenditures to sales ratio, a widely-used proxy for proprietary technological skills, 
have been found to prefer greenfields in all nine studies that included this variable, presumably 
because the many technological assets of these MNEs are largely firm-embedded and hence 
more costly to exploit through acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993)8. Consistent with the main 
prediction derived from the theory of the growth of the firm, four out of six studies found that 
MNEs that expand through relatively large subsidiaries are more likely to make acquisitions 
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 The year in which an entry took place is the only variable that cannot be attributed to one of these categories. We 
therefore put this variable in a ‘miscellaneous’ category. 
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rather than greenfield investments. The likely reason is that MNEs often lack the capacity to 
recruit and train the many managers required to run a large greenfield subsidiary (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986). 
Two predictions derived from the industrial organization literature are also supported across a 
large number of studies. First, all seven studies examining the impact of the growth rate of the 
industry entered found that the likelihood of greenfield entry initially increases with industry 
growth. The likely reason is that the increase in capacity that comes with greenfield investments 
is more tolerable for incumbents when an industry is expanding than when it is static (Zejan, 
1990). It is less clear, however, what happens when an industry is growing very rapidly. Three 
studies found that greenfield entry becomes even more likely, while the other four found that 
acquisitions become more likely, presumably because they make speedy entry possible, which is 
desirable when an industry is growing very rapidly (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994). Second, five out of six studies found that MNEs are more likely to enter 
countries with higher per capita incomes through acquisitions, presumably because suitable 
takeover targets are more readily available in such countries (e.g., Zejan, 1990). A final 
consistent finding obtained by seven out of eight studies is that more recent entries are more 
likely to have been acquisitions rather than greenfield investments. 
A few other predictions of the dominant perspectives described in section 2.2 have also 
received empirical support. Specifically, Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) found support for their 
organizational-learning based prediction that MNEs with extensive greenfield experience prefer 
greenfields and those with extensive acquisition experience acquisitions, while Harzing (2002) 
found support for her institutional theory-based argument that MNEs following a global strategy 
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 Exploiting technological assets through acquisitions may be especially difficult in developing countries because 
this is likely to require many changes in the acquired unit. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point 
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prefer greenfields and those following a multidomestic strategy acquisitions. These predictions 
have so far not been tested in other studies. 
Table 3 shows that the findings for many other variables have been inconsistent. To give a 
striking example, even though the transaction cost/internalization and the organizational learning 
perspective both predict that MNEs with extensive international experience are more likely to 
choose greenfields, only four out of 12 studies found empirical support for this prediction 
(Wilson, 1980; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000), with the other eight finding that such MNEs are either more (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986; Forsgren, 1989; Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Harzing, 2002) or equally likely 
(Zejan, 1990; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Meyer and Estrin, 1997; Larimo, 2003) to choose 
acquisitions. Similarly, although several studies found that subsidiaries offering products 
different from those offered by their parents are more likely to be established through 
acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993; Hennart et al., 1996; Larimo, 2003; Chen and Zeng, 2004), 
others found that such subsidiaries are either more (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000) or equally 
likely (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Zejan, 1990; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999) to be established through greenfield 
investments. In the next section we will try to reconcile these findings by identifying several 
potential causes for their inconsistency. 
3. Causes of the inconsistent findings 
As shown above, the empirical literature on the determinants of establishment mode choice 
has often obtained inconsistent findings. We argue that these inconsistencies are caused by (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to our attention. 
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the existence of unrecognized moderating effects and (2) research-design related problems9. 
3.1. Unrecognized moderating effects 
Table 2 showed that transaction cost/internalization theory and information economics 
disagree on how an MNE’s establishment mode choice is affected by its host-country experience 
and the extent to which its products are related to those of the focal subsidiary. Moreover, Table 
3 shows that the empirical findings for these two variables have been inconsistent as well. 
Transaction cost/internalization theory predicts that MNEs with little host-country experience 
prefer acquisitions in order to efficiently obtain tacit knowledge of the local market (Hennart and 
Park, 1993; Caves, 1996), while information economics suggests that such MNEs prefer 
greenfields because they are likely to lack the knowledge to evaluate and integrate local takeover 
targets (Hennart and Park, 1993; Hennart et al., 1996). Given the inconsistent empirical findings, 
we argue that the effect of host-country experience on the propensity to acquire is moderated by 
the extent to which MNEs intend to integrate the focal subsidiary into their corporate network. If 
they intend to tightly integrate the focal subsidiary, as is often the case when the objective of 
foreign expansion is to exploit capabilities of the parent, MNEs with little host-country 
experience will prefer greenfields because they will find it very difficult to integrate acquisitions 
made in countries with which they have little experience. Moreover, MNEs that tightly integrate 
their subsidiaries do not aim to be locally responsive and hence do not need to make acquisitions 
to obtain local market knowledge. In contrast, if they intend to grant the focal subsidiary 
considerable autonomy, MNEs with little host-country experience will prefer acquisitions, 
because quasi-autonomous acquisitions are relatively easy to manage, even for MNEs with little 
                                                           
9
 As suggested by an anonymous referee, another cause of the mixed findings, and particularly of the many non-
significant ones, could be that the statistical power of the empirical tests performed in the 15 studies was 
insufficient. However, given the generally large samples analyzed (see Table 1), we contend that low power is 
unlikely to be a major cause of the mixed findings. 
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experience of the host country. In addition, MNEs granting their subsidiaries much autonomy 
aim to locally responsive and hence need to have intimate knowledge of the local market. Such 
MNEs will be eager to obtain this knowledge through acquisitions, especially when they have 
little host-country experience. 
A similar argument can be made for the relatedness of a subsidiary’s products to those of its 
MNE parent. Transaction cost/internalization theory posits that MNEs which expand abroad to 
manufacture products very different from those produced at home tend to make acquisitions to 
obtain the required tacit product-specific knowledge (Hennart and Park, 1993; Caves, 1996), 
while information economics suggests that such MNEs prefer greenfields because they lack 
information on existing firms in the new industries entered (Hennart and Park, 1993). Given that 
both of these predictions have received empirical support, it may again be that their validity is 
contingent upon the level of subsidiary integration. If they intend to tightly integrate the focal 
subsidiary, MNEs expanding into new industries may prefer greenfields because they may find it 
too difficult to integrate acquisitions made in industries with which they have little experience. 
On the other hand, if they intend to grant the focal subsidiary much autonomy, MNEs expanding 
into new industries may prefer acquisitions, since they will find it relatively easy to manage 
acquisitions made in unfamiliar industries if they grant these acquisitions much autonomy. In 
sum, the opposing predictions of transaction cost/internalization theory and information 
economics can be reconciled by introducing the level of subsidiary integration desired by the 
MNE as a moderating variable, with transaction cost/internalization theory having more 
explanatory power at low levels of integration and information economics at high levels. 
The mixed findings regarding the relationship between cultural distance and establishment 
mode choice may also be due to the fact that the level of subsidiary integration moderates this 
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relationship. As shown in Table 3, three studies found support for the prediction of the extended 
transaction cost/internalization perspective that the likelihood of greenfield entry increases with 
cultural distance (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2002), while three 
others did not (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000). These mixed findings may be caused by the fact that the additional costs of 
transferring practices to an acquired subsidiary located in a culturally-distant country over the 
costs of transferring these practices to a greenfield subsidiary located in such a country depend 
on the extent to which the subsidiary is integrated by its MNE parent. Parents intending to tightly 
integrate their subsidiaries will typically try to transfer their practices to these subsidiaries. For 
such parents it will be more costly to transfer their practices to acquired subsidiaries located in 
culturally-distant countries than to greenfield subsidiaries located in such countries, as the former 
come with employees who are used to radically-different practices, whereas the latter come with 
fresh employees who are more open to the MNE’s practices. As a result, MNEs intending to 
tightly integrate their subsidiaries are more likely to enter culturally-distant countries through 
greenfields rather than through acquisitions. Parents intending to grant their subsidiaries much 
autonomy, on the other hand, often let these subsidiaries use local practices. In such cases there 
will hardly be any cross-border transfers of practices, and the attractiveness of greenfield over 
acquisition entry will not increase with cultural distance. Another possibility is that the 
relationship between cultural distance and the likelihood of greenfield entry is contingent upon 
an MNE’s international or host-country experience. For MNEs with little international or host-
country experience acquisitions in culturally-distant countries may indeed be more problematic 
than greenfields, but for those with extensive international or host-country experience this may 
not be the case. 
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As stated earlier, even though transaction cost/internalization theory and the organizational 
learning perspective both predict that an MNE’s preference for greenfields increases with its 
international experience, empirical tests of prediction have yielded inconsistent findings. These 
inconsistencies may have arisen because the relationship between an MNE’s international 
experience and its preference for greenfields is likely to be moderated by its product diversity. 
When they produce only a few products, internationally-experienced MNEs are likely to prefer 
greenfields, either because they want to efficiently exploit their gradually-accumulated 
technological skills (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), or because they already possess sufficient 
knowledge of the international arena and hence do not need to make acquisitions to obtain this 
knowledge (Larimo, 2003). At high levels of product diversity, however, MNEs typically have 
an M-form structure (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) and advanced management control skills, 
which reduces the costs of making and managing acquisitions (Caves and Mehra, 1986). As a 
result, internationally-experienced MNEs producing many different products are more likely to 
make acquisitions. This conjecture is supported by Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), who found 
that internationally-experienced MNEs were less likely to choose greenfields when they were 
highly product diversified. 
Figure 1 summarizes the above discussion in a conceptual model, which may serve as a 
template for future establishment mode studies. The exact set of control variables required 
depends on the research design chosen, an issue to which we will turn now. 
3.2. Research-design related problems 
The second reason why the findings of the establishment mode literature have frequently been 
inconsistent is that many studies suffer from research-design related problems. As we will show 
below, most studies have included multiple home or host countries in their sample but have been 
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unable to enter or accurately operationalize all relevant variables, thereby introducing the risk 
that their findings contain biases. 
Multiple host countries. As shown in Table 1, 11 of the 15 studies reviewed analyzed MNE 
entries into multiple countries. A disadvantage of this research design is that these countries are 
likely to have, to a varying extent, governmental and/or institutional barriers to acquisition10. 
Host-government restrictions on foreign acquisitions constitute the most well-known acquisition 
barrier. Virtually all countries imposed such restrictions during the time periods covered by most 
establishment mode studies, notably the 1970s and 1980s. Some countries prohibited all foreign 
acquisitions (e.g., China), others required prior governmental approval (e.g., Japan), and some 
restricted acquisitions in strategic industries (e.g., Canada) (Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995). 
Although several countries relaxed their foreign acquisitions restrictions in the 1990s 
(UNCTAD, 2000), many countries still have a certain amount of such restrictions in place. It 
therefore remains important to control for them, because they still limit the possibilities of MNEs 
to make acquisitions. Cho and Padmanabhan (1995), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), and 
Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) included a dummy variable equal to one if the government of a 
host country imposed restrictions on foreign acquisitions11. However, this approach is sub-
optimal for several reasons. First, governmental restrictions vary in intensity across countries and 
over time, and hence require a more fine-grained measure than a binary one (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990). Second, including a restrictive host-country dummy makes it impossible to determine 
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 Inter-country differences in acquisition barriers result in large differences in foreign acquisition activity across 
countries (see e.g., Healy and Palepu, 1993). 
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 Surprisingly, Cho and Padmanabhan (1995) and Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) found that Japanese entries into 
countries with governmental restrictions on foreign acquisitions are more likely to be acquisitions. Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995) offer three possible explanations. Firstly, it may be that governmental restrictions on 
acquisitions are not binding, but negotiable. Secondly, the existence of such restrictions may signal that suitable 
acquisition candidates are present, which may attract foreign acquirers. Thirdly, there may be a bias towards 
acquisitions in countries with governmental restrictions if MNEs that fail to obtain governmental approval decide 
not to invest at all, instead of making a greenfield investment.   
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whether the effects of the independent variables reflect the preferences of MNEs for either 
greenfields or acquisitions, or whether they reflect the outcome of a bargaining process between 
these MNEs and restrictive host-country governments. Separating these two explanations in 
samples containing entries into both restrictive and non-restrictive countries requires a more 
sophisticated statistical approach, such as the one used by Gomes-Casseres (1990). Finally, 
governmental restrictions are not the only acquisition barrier affecting establishment mode 
choices by MNEs. Other barriers include acquisition restrictions in firms’ statutes of 
incorporation (Lam, 1997), the existence of shares without voting rights (Rydqvist, 1992), and 
share ownership by parties who are reluctant to sell their shares, such as families, governments, 
and banks (Healy and Palepu, 1993). The height of these additional acquisition barriers has been 
found to vary across countries (Lam, 1997; Rydqvist, 1992; Healy and Palepu, 1993; Pedersen 
and Thomsen, 1997) and even across industries within a given country (Pedersen and Thomsen, 
1999). 
Since most of the above acquisition barriers are hard to measure, many establishment mode 
studies were unable to control for their existence. This is likely to have reduced the effects of the 
variables analyzed in these studies to an extent that varies with the overall height of these 
barriers in each sample, and may thus explain some the mixed empirical findings. In samples 
where acquisition barriers were absent or low, on one hand, such as in samples composed of 
entries into the US, the regression coefficients of the parent, subsidiary, industry, and country-
level variables are likely to reflect the true effects of these variables. In samples where 
acquisition barriers were more prominent, on the other hand, the coefficients of these variables 
are likely to be biased towards non-significance. The reason is that such samples are likely to 
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include greenfield entries that would have been acquisition entries had there not been acquisition 
barriers. 
A second disadvantage of studying MNE entries into multiple countries is that it is difficult to 
obtain (comparable) industry-level archival data for multiple countries. As a result, several 
studies (Wilson, 1980; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Harzing, 
2002; Larimo, 2003) were forced to exclude theoretically-important industry-level variables 
from their models (see Table 3), which may have biased some of their empirical findings. Cho 
and Padmanabhan (1995) and Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), for example, found relatively many 
non-significant effects for their parent and subsidiary-level variables, such as a subsidiary’s 
relative size. Although the effect of this variable may have been truly insignificant, it may also 
have been driven by the structural conditions of the industries entered by the MNEs included in 
Cho and Padmanabhan’s sample. It may be, for example, that these MNEs did prefer to establish 
small subsidiaries from scratch and to acquire large ones (as predicted by the theory of the 
growth of the firm), but that a generally slow growth of the industries they entered persuaded 
many of them to acquire small subsidiaries as well, so as to avoid retaliation by incumbents. The 
omission of industry growth may thus have attenuated the effect of the focal subsidiary’s relative 
size on the choice of establishment mode. Similarly, Harzing (2002) hypothesized and found that 
MNEs following global strategies prefer greenfields, while those following multidomestic 
strategies prefer acquisitions. Unfortunately, she was also unable to include industry-level 
variables, which leaves her findings open to alternative explanations. Specifically, since many 
industries in which MNEs follow global strategies go through stages of rapid growth12, and since 
she did not control for industry growth, it may be that the MNEs in her sample preferred 
                                                           
12
 High-technology industries are an example of such industries. 
 28
greenfields over acquisitions because they entered fast-growing industries, and not because they 
followed a global strategy. 
Some studies that analyzed MNE entries into multiple countries attempted to control for 
industry growth but used sub-optimal proxies. Specifically, Andersson and Svensson (1994), 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), and Larimo (2003) included in their models the growth rate of 
the host economy as a whole rather than that of the industry entered. It is hardly surprising that 
two of these studies found that this country growth rate had no effect on the establishment mode 
choices of the MNEs included in their sample, since industries within a given country may 
exhibit radically-different growth rates. 
Multiple home countries. As shown in Table 1, six of the 15 studies included in our review 
analyzed foreign entries by MNE parents from different home countries. A disadvantage of this 
approach is that it is difficult to obtain archival data on parents located in different countries, as 
such data may be partly or fully unavailable for specific countries, or non-comparable across 
these countries owing to national differences in accounting practices (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Parent-level data on R&D expenditures, for example, is only available for a few countries, 
including Japan. As a result, some authors examining foreign entries by MNE parents from 
different home countries had to proxy the firm-embedded technological skills of these parents by 
the R&D intensity of their home industry (Larimo, 2003) or by that of the foreign industry 
entered (Caves and Mehra, 1986)13. However, the R&D intensity of MNEs expanding abroad 
may systematically diverge from these industry-level R&D intensities. Foreign MNEs are 
typically at a disadvantage compared to their host-country rivals because they have less 
knowledge of the local market, and will therefore only expand abroad if they can compensate for 
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 Chen and Zeng (2004) also included the R&D intensity of the industry entered, but they did so to capture the 
presence of technological barriers to entry rather than an MNE’s unique technological skills.  
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this disadvantage by having superior product or process technologies (Hymer, 1976). Hence, the 
average R&D intensity of the foreign industry entered systematically underestimates an MNE’s 
unique technological skills, which may explain why Caves and Mehra (1986) found this intensity 
to have no effect on establishment mode choice. A more accurate proxy for an MNE’s firm-
specific technological skills is its own R&D intensity. As stated earlier, all nine studies that used 
this proxy found that it had the expected positive effect on the likelihood of greenfields14.  
A second disadvantage of studying foreign entries by MNEs from different countries is that an 
MNE’s national origin may affect its establishment mode choice. There is, for instance, evidence 
that MNEs from uncertainty-avoiding countries prefer both partially and wholly-owned 
greenfields to full acquisitions (Kogut and Singh, 1988). While some studies account for 
potential national origin effects by including parent-country dummies (Wilson, 1980; Hennart et 
al., 1996; Meyer and Estrin, 1997), others do not, which may have biased their parent-level 
variables, as these are sometimes correlated with parent-country characteristics. For example, 
whereas the organizational learning and the transaction cost/internalization perspective both 
predict that internationally-experienced MNEs are more likely to choose greenfields, Caves and 
Mehra (1986) and Harzing (2002) found that such MNEs are more likely to choose acquisitions. 
These scholars may have obtained these unexpected findings because they did not control for 
differences in the level of economic development of the home bases of the MNEs in their 
sample. Internationally-experienced MNEs are more likely to be based in developed than in 
developing countries because firms from developed countries started to internationalize earlier. 
According to UNCTAD (2000) figures, MNEs based in developed countries have a higher 
preference for acquisitions than those based in developing countries. Had Caves and Mehra 
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 Two other studies (Meyer and Estrin, 1997; Larimo, 2003) included the parent’s R&D expenditures and the R&D 
intensity of the industry of the parent, respectively, and found that these variables had a positive effect on the 
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(1986) and Harzing (2002) controlled for parent-country differences in economic development 
levels, they might have obtained the predicted negative effect of an MNE’s international 
experience on its propensity to acquire. 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1. Summary and conclusions  
In this piece we reviewed the empirical literature on the determinants of an MNE’s choice 
between greenfield investment and acquisition. To gain detailed insight of this literature, we first 
identified 15 studies that conceptualize these two establishment modes in the same way and 
whose arguments and findings can hence be meaningfully compared. We then reviewed the 
theoretical perspectives most often used by these studies, viz. transaction cost/internalization 
theory, the organizational learning perspective, information economics, the theory of the growth 
of the firm, the industrial organization literature, and institutional theory. We found that these 
perspectives complement each other to a considerable extent in that they identify different 
parent, subsidiary, industry, and country-level determinants of an MNE’s establishment mode 
choice. However, we also found that the first three perspectives make several contradictory 
predictions. We showed that these contradictions arise because the perspectives model an MNE’s 
capabilities or its lack thereof in different ways.    
We then moved on to the empirical findings obtained by our 15 comparable studies, and 
found that these findings have often been inconsistent. For instance, only six of the 22 
independent variables entered in multiple studies had robust significant effects across these 
studies. We discussed two potential causes of these mixed findings. The first is the existence of 
moderating effects which have not been considered by the literature. Specifically, the effects of 
an MNE’s host-country experience and the relatedness of its products to those of the focal 
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subsidiary are likely to be contingent upon the level of subsidiary integration desired by the 
MNE. The impact of cultural distance may also be moderated by the level of subsidiary 
integration, or by an MNE’s international or host-country experience. Finally, the impact of an 
MNE’s international experience may hinge on its degree of product diversity. The second 
potential cause of the mixed findings is that, owing to their choice of research design, scholars 
have frequently been forced to exclude relevant variables or to rely on suboptimal proxies. 
Various acquisition barriers, industry-level variables, and characteristics of the MNE’s home 
country have often been omitted, and several variables have been poorly operationalized, thereby 
introducing the risk that the regression coefficients of some or all of the included variables have 
been biased. 
We believe that future establishment mode research will benefit from considering the issues 
addressed in this paper. We have a number of recommendations, some of which – although 
directed to establishment mode researchers – may also prove useful to other international 
management scholars.  
4.2. Recommendations 
To synthesize the opposing theoretical predictions and mixed empirical findings with respect 
to several key variables, we identified several possible moderating effects in our review. We urge 
future research to examine whether these moderating effects indeed exist, so as to assess whether 
some of the seemingly contradictory theoretical perspectives can be integrated at least partly, and 
whether some of the mixed empirical findings can be reconciled. 
As stated earlier, the firm-level theoretical perspectives used by the establishment mode 
literature typically focus on an MNE’s resources and capabilities or its lack thereof. These 
perspectives thus ignore the role of local resources and capabilities, as well as the difficulties of 
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combining them with those of the MNE. The 15 studies reviewed have, for instance, largely 
ignored the potential synergies resulting from an acquisition, as well as the costs of realizing 
them. More theoretical contributions in this area, especially those focusing on the 
complementary resources and capabilities of local firms (Shimizu et al., 2004), are therefore 
called for. One such contribution, initiated by Hennart and Park (1993) and further developed in 
Hennart (2000), is the conceptualization of both greenfield investments and acquisitions as 
combinations of MNE and local assets. From this perspective, the key difference between both 
establishment modes is that the complementary local assets are obtained from different markets, 
i.e. from the market for inputs such as land, equipment, and labor in case of a greenfield, and 
from that for corporate control in case of an acquisition. This conceptualization suggests that an 
MNE’s choice between a greenfield and an acquisition hinges on which establishment mode 
combines the MNE and local assets in the most efficient way. MNEs may be expected to choose 
that establishment mode whose combination of MNE and local assets provides the highest net 
benefits. Consider the following cases. Japanese car manufacturers, on the one hand, entered the 
US in the 1980s through greenfields because their main competitive asset, i.e. sophisticated labor 
management practices, would have been difficult to combine with the assets of existing US firms 
(Hennart, 2000), as the workforce of these US firms would have had to unlearn many of their 
existing practices (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Harzing, 2002). US food companies, on the 
other hand, typically entered Eastern Europe in the 1990s through acquisitions because their 
most important competitive asset, i.e. superior advertising and distribution skills, could easily be 
combined with the locally-established brand names and quality products of existing Eastern-
European food companies which had superior knowledge of local consumer tastes and 
production conditions (Hennart, 2000). We recommend that future studies take these important 
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bundling issues into account, for instance by drawing on the strategic management literature on 
acquisitions, which has extensively examined the synergies and costs associated with 
acquisitions (e.g., Capron, 1999). 
Another perspective that has received relatively little attention in the establishment mode 
literature is institutional theory. Although Harzing (2002) has used this theory to show that 
MNEs’ establishment mode choices are affected by both parental and host-country pressures for 
conformity, the empirical literature has not yet examined whether these choices are also affected 
by other institutional factors, such as the establishment mode choices made by firms from the 
same home country or by firms already operating in the target country. Recent empirical work 
has shown that such institutional factors strongly affect subsidiary ownership choices by MNEs 
(Lu, 2002; Guillen, 2003), and may hence serve as a valuable template for future establishment 
mode studies on this topic. 
As stated earlier, establishment mode scholars using transaction cost/internalization theory 
have argued that tacit technological knowledge is time-consuming to develop internally and 
difficult to purchase on the market, and that MNEs lacking such knowledge will therefore choose 
acquisitions to efficiently obtain it. However, these scholars have ignored the fact that MNEs that 
have obtained this knowledge through acquisitions may need to transfer it to other parts of their 
network in order to benefit from it. According to the knowledge-based view, such intra-firm 
transfers of knowledge are difficult and time consuming, and should hence not be taken for 
granted (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1993; Martin and Salomon, 2003), especially when the acquired 
subsidiary has only weak ties with the other subsidiaries of the MNE (Szulanski, 1996; Kostova, 
1999). We encourage future establishment mode studies to take into account these transfer costs 
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and to examine why, or under which conditions, these costs are likely to be lower than the costs 
of obtaining tacit knowledge through market exchange or through internal development. 
On the methodological side we encourage scholars to select their research design more 
carefully. Scholars interested in parent, subsidiary, or industry-level determinants of an MNE’s 
establishment mode choice should preferably analyze samples of entries by MNE parents from a 
single home country into a single host country (cf. Hennart and Park, 1993; Chen and Zeng, 
2004). The reason is that this research design does not require controls for home and host-
country effects, such as hard-to-measure host-country acquisition barriers. Scholars intending to 
use archival data should select their home and host country on the basis of the availability of 
reliable and comparable parent, subsidiary, and industry-level data. A caveat with this research 
design is that the empirical findings obtained may not be generalizable. For instance, Hennart 
and Park’s (1993) and Chen and Zeng’s (2004) findings may only apply to Japanese MNEs 
entering a highly-developed country like the US, and may have limited applicability to MNEs 
from other countries entering different host markets. 
On the other hand, scholars interested in country-level determinants should include a large 
number of heterogeneous home and/or host countries. Specifically, studies focusing on home-
country determinants, such as the culture of an MNE’s home base, should preferably use samples 
of entries by MNE parents from a large number of culturally-dissimilar home countries into a 
single host country, while those focusing on host-country effects should take the opposite 
approach15. Whenever multiple home and/or host countries are involved, scholars should 
properly control for potential parent, subsidiary, and industry-level effects predicted by 
                                                           
15
 Note that the effect of some variables can be examined through several research designs. For example, scholars 
interested in the impact of cultural distance may either analyze foreign entries by MNEs (i) from one home country 
into multiple host countries, (ii) from different home countries into one host country, or (iii) from different home 
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complementary theories (see Table 2). Another way to control for these effects is to limit 
samples to specific types of MNEs, such as those with similar levels of international experience, 
active in a specific industry. Table 4 summarizes these possibilities. 
Besides focusing on entries by MNEs from a single home country into a single host country, 
another, perhaps second-best, strategy for scholars interested in parent, subsidiary, or industry-
level determinants is to include multiple home and/or host countries and to control for country-
level factors. Scholars including multiple host countries in their sample should carefully control 
for acquisition barriers such as governmental restrictions and corporate ownership by 
shareholders reluctant to sell their stakes (see Healy and Palepu, 1993; Makino and Beamish, 
1998; Henisz, 2000), and for other relevant country-level factors such as cultural distance. 
Another option is to control for all these effects simultaneously by including host-country 
dummies (e.g., Estrin and Meyer, 1997). Scholars including multiple home countries are 
encouraged to control for potential home-country effects, such as culture-related establishment 
mode preferences. The most efficient way to do so is to include home-country dummies (Wilson, 
1980). 
 We also urge scholars to include all relevant variables in their models, so as to avoid omitted-
variable biases and to rule out alternative explanations. Specifically, we encourage future studies 
to take into account those theoretically-important constructs listed in Table 2 that could influence 
the choice of establishment mode in the selected empirical setting. To avoid biases, these 
constructs should be operationalized accurately, which has not always been the case. Table 5 lists 
several constructs whose operationalization could be improved, along with alternative measures 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
countries into multiple host countries, as all these research designs may produce sufficient variation in cultural 
distance. 
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used by other studies. If comparable archival data on industry and/or country-level factors is 
unavailable, industry and/or country dummies should be included. 
Besides factual data, researchers could also rely on managerial perceptions to operationalize 
certain constructs. Except for Harzing (2002), who used such perceptions to measure an MNE’s 
international strategy, all establishment mode studies included in our review relied exclusively 
on factual data. The main advantage of perceptual measures is that they make it possible, by 
carefully designing and formulating survey questions, to reflect theoretical constructs more 
closely, thus reducing the likelihood of biases. This is especially relevant for complex constructs 
that are difficult to measure through archival data, such as an MNE’s firm-embedded 
technological skills and certain types of acquisition barriers. In addition, strategic decisions such 
as entry mode choices ultimately reflect managerial perceptions (Boyd et al., 1993), and may 
therefore be better explained by perceptual measures. Future establishment mode research could 
thus benefit from making wider use of such measures. 
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Table 1 
Main characteristics of the 15 comparable studies 
Study Theoretical perspective(s) used Home market(s) Host market(s) Time period Sample size Method 
Wilson (1980) Exploratory Various Various 1900 – 1967/1971 ? OLS 
Caves and Mehra 
(1986) 
Theory of the growth of the firm, transaction 
cost/internalization theory, agency theory, 
industrial organization 
Various U.S. 1974 – 1980 138 Binary probit 
Forsgren (1989) Transaction cost/internalization theory, 
network theory Sweden Various 1970 – 1982 33 OLS 
Zejan (1990) Transaction cost/internalization theory, industrial organization Sweden Various 1969 – 1978 250 Binary probit 
Hennart and Park 
(1993) 
Transaction cost/internalization theory, 
industrial organization, information 
economics, theory of the growth of the firm, 
theory of capital market imperfections 
Japan U.S. 1978 – 1980 and 1984 – 1987 270 Binary logit 
Andersson and 
Svensson (1994) Resource-based view Sweden Various ± 1961 – 1990 ± 1000 Binary logit 
Cho and 
Padmanabhan 
(1995) 
Transaction cost/internalization theory, 
organizational learning, bargaining power 
model 
Japan Various 1969 – 1991 756 Binary logit 
Hennart, Larimo, 
and Chen (1996) 
Transaction cost/internalization theory, 
industrial organization, information 
economics 
Japan and 
Finland U.S. 1978 – 1993 401 Binary logit 
Meyer and Estrin 
(1997) 
Transaction cost/internalization theory, 
industrial organization 
Germany and 
U.K. Various early 1990s 211 Binary logit 
Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998) Organizational learning The Netherlands Various 1966 – 1994 829 Binary logit 
Padmanabhan and 
Cho (1999) Organizational learning Japan Various 1969 – 1991 752 Binary logit 
Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000) 
Institutional theory, cultural model, 
transaction cost/internalization theory Japan 
Six Western-
European countries 1981 – ? 136 Binary logit 
Harzing (2002) Ownership-Location-Internalization paradigm, institutional theory Various Various ? – mid 1990s 277 Binary logit 
Larimo (2003) Transaction cost/internalization theory The four Nordic 
countries Various 1960 – 1999 3524 Binary logit 
Chen and Zeng 
(2004) Theory of barriers to entry Japan U.S. 
1978 – 1980 and 
1984 – 1987 269 Binary logit 
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Table 2 
Predictions of the dominant theories 
Construct TCI OL IE TGF IO IT 
parent’s technological knowledge –      
parent’s international experience – –     
parent’s host-country experience –  +    
relatedness of subsidiary’s products to 
those of parent –  +    
parent’s degree of product diversity + – / ∪     
cultural distance between home and 
host country –      
parent’s experience with greenfields  –     
parent’s experience with acquisitions  +     
relative subsidiary size    +   
concentration level of industry entered     + / –  
growth rate of industry entered     – / ∪  
availability of takeover targets     +  
parent follows multidomestic rather 
than global strategy      + 
 
+ = increases the likelihood of acquisition entry, – = increases the likelihood of greenfield entry, 
∪ = curvilinear effect on the likelihood of acquisition entry 
 
TCI = transaction cost/internalization theory 
OL = organizational learning perspective 
IE = information economics 
TGF = theory of the growth of the firm 
IO = industrial organization perspective 
IT = institutional theory 
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Table 3 
Empirical findings (+ = increases the likelihood of acquisition entry) 
Parent-level variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
parent is British 
–
1 
              
parent is German n.s.1        n.s.3       
parent is Japanese 
–
1 
      
–
2 
       
parent is American +1               
parent is non-European         
–
3 
      
parent’s % of subsidiaries in less-developed countries 
– 
              
parent’s international experience 
– 
+ + n.s.  + n.s.  n.s. 
– – – 
+ n.s.  
parent’s regional experience         n.s.       
parent’s host-country experience      n.s. + n.s. ∩  + n.s.   n.s.  
parent’s experience with greenfields           
–
 
    
parent’s experience with acquisitions           +     
parent’s degree of product diversity + + + + n.s.  n.s.  + ∪ n.s. + n.s. +  
parent’s R&D intensity   
– 
 
– – – – 
  
– – – 
 
– 
parent’s R&D expenditures         
– 
      
parent is first to enter industry  n.s.              
parent is follower  n.s.   
– 
          
parent size   n.s.   + n.s. n.s. ∩ n.s. n.s.   +  
parent’s endowment in human resources     +           
parent’s leverage     n.s.           
parent’s advertising intensity     n.s.           
parent’s advertising expenditures in home country               n.s. 
parent’s advertising expenditures in host country               
– 
parent’s market position       n.s.    n.s.     
factor costs motivation for entry         +       
parent’s labor intensity         
– 
      
parent’s profitability          +      
parent follows multidomestic rather than global strategy             +   
Subsidiary-level variables                
relatedness of subsidiary’s products to those of parent  n.s.  n.s. 
– 
 n.s. 
– 
 n.s. n.s. +  
– – 
relative subsidiary size  +   +  n.s.    n.s. + +   
subsidiary is joint venture  
– 
  n.s.   n.s.  n.s.    
– 
 
entry is into durable goods industry  
– 
             
entry is into resource-intensive industry        +        
entry is into non-food consumer goods industry         
– 
      
entry is into food and beverage industry         +       
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Table 3 (continued) 
Empirical findings 
Industry-level variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
concentration level of industry entered  +   n.s.   
– 
      
– 
growth rate of industry entered  ∪  – ∪   ∪ –   –   ∪ 
number of firms in subsidiary’s size-class  n.s.              
R&D intensity of industry entered  n.s.             n.s. 
R&D intensity of industry in which parent is active              
– 
 
advertising intensity of industry entered  n.s.             + 
brand equity of industry entered (reputation barriers)               ∪ 
percentage of industry shipments to retailers               + 
Country-level variables                
size of host economy    n.s.      n.s.      
growth rate of host economy      n.s.    n.s.    
– 
 
host-country per capita income    +  + +   n.s. +   +  
availability of bargains in host country     n.s.           
host-government restrictions       +   
– 
+     
cultural distance between home and host country       n.s.   
– 
n.s. n.s. 
– – 
 
uncertainty avoidance of host country            
– 
   
host-country risk          
–
4 
     
Miscellaneous                
year of entry +   +  + n.s.   + +  + +  
 
1
 compared to what Wilson (1980) labels parents from ‘other’ countries, 2 compared to Finnish parents, 3 compared to British parents, 4 partial support 
was found 
 
+ = increases the likelihood of acquisition entry, – = increases the likelihood of greenfield entry, ∪ and ∩ = curvilinear effect on likelihood of 
acquisition entry, n.s. = not significant 
 
1. Wilson (1980)     6. Andersson and Svensson (1994)  11. Padmanabhan and Cho (1999) 
2. Caves and Mehra (1986)    7. Cho and Padmanabhan (1995)  12. Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) 
3. Forsgren (1989)     8. Hennart, Larimo, and Chen (1996) 13. Harzing (2002) 
4. Zejan (1990)     9. Meyer and Estrin (1997)   14. Larimo (2003) 
5. Hennart and Park (1993)  10. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998)  15. Chen and Zeng (2004) 
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Table 4 
Types of research designs and when to use them 
Type of 
research 
design: 
To be used by scholars 
interested in: 
How to obtain reliable results? 
One home 
country, 
multiple host 
countries 
Host-country factors (e.g., 
institutional quality of host 
country) 
- Control for parent, subsidiary, and industry-level 
variables, or focus on MNEs that are similar (e.g., in 
terms of experience) and/or active in a single industry 
- Control for other host-country factors 
Multiple home 
countries, one 
host country 
Home-country factors (e.g., 
cultural characteristics of 
home country) 
- Control for parent, subsidiary, and industry-level 
variables, or focus on MNEs that are similar (e.g., in 
terms of experience) and/or active in a single industry 
- Control for other home-country factors 
Multiple home 
and host 
countries 
Home- and host-country 
factors 
- Control for parent, subsidiary, and industry-level 
variables, or focus on MNEs that are similar (e.g., in 
terms of experience) and/or active in a single industry 
- Control for other home- and host-country factors 
One home and 
host country 
Parent, subsidiary, and 
industry-level factors 
Results are likely to be reliable but are not necessarily 
generalizable 
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Table 5 
Constructs whose operationalization could be improved 
Construct Study Operationalization Limitation Preferred operationalization through archival data 
Parent’s firm-embedded 
technological skills 
- Caves and Mehra 
(1986) 
- Larimo (2003) 
- R&D intensity of 
industry entered 
- R&D intensity of 
industry in which 
parent is active (low, 
medium, high) 
An industry’s R&D 
intensity is unlikely to 
accurately reflect a firm’s 
technological skills 
Parent’s R&D intensity (e.g., Hennart, 1991; Agarwal, 
1994; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995) 
Parent’s marketing skills Caves and Mehra 
(1986) 
Advertising intensity of 
industry entered 
An industry’s advertising 
intensity is unlikely to 
accurately reflect a firm’s 
marketing skills 
Parent’s advertising intensity (e.g., Hennart, 1991; Hennart 
and Park, 1993) 
Parent’s international 
experience 
- Forsgren (1989) 
- Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000) 
- Foreign to total sales 
- Parent’s export ratio 
Firms with a high share of 
foreign sales or a high 
export ratio may still have 
limited international 
experience (cf. Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977) 
- Number of foreign subsidiaries (e.g., Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988; Andersson and Svensson, 1994) 
- Number of years firm has been operating abroad (e.g., 
Erramilli, 1991; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995) 
- Number of countries in which firm has subsidiaries 
(e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001) 
- Total count-years of international experience 
(Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Cho and 
Padmanabhan, 2005) 
- Benefit to quick 
entry 
- Scope for new firms 
 
- Andersson and 
Svensson (1994) 
- Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998), 
Larimo (2003) 
- Host country’s GDP 
growth 
- Host country’s GNP 
growth 
Industries within a given 
country may exhibit 
radically-different growth 
rates 
- Growth rate of industry entered (e.g., Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001) 
- Absolute value of industry growth’s deviation from its 
sample mean divided by its standard deviation (e.g., 
Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Reddy, 1997) 
- Difficulty to 
establish a 
greenfield 
- Disturbances that a 
greenfield causes in 
the market shares 
and revenues of 
incumbents 
 
- Zejan (1990) 
- Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998) 
- Host country’s GDP 
- Host country’s GNP 
It is unclear why it would 
be more difficult to 
establish greenfields in 
large countries, and why 
greenfields would cause 
large disturbances in 
incumbents’ market shares 
and revenues in such 
countries 
- Growth rate of industry entered (e.g., Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001) 
- Absolute value of industry growth’s deviation from its 
sample mean divided by its standard deviation (e.g., 
Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Reddy, 1997) 
 
 47 
Figure 1 
Conceptual model 
 
+ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
+ 
_ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
Relatedness of 
subsidiary’s products to 
those of parent 
 
Level of subsidiary 
integration 
 
Parent’s host-country 
experience 
 
Cultural distance between 
home and host country 
 
Parent’s international 
experience 
 
Parent’s degree of 
product diversity 
 
Likelihood of 
acquisition entry 
 
Control variables 
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2007 
 
Leadership Behaviour and Upward Feedback: Findings From a Longitudinal Intervention 
Dirk van Dierendonck, Clare Haynes, Carol Borrill and Chris Stride 
ERS-2007-003-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8579
 
The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutionalizing New Power Relations 
Bettina B.F. Wittneben 
ERS-2007-004-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8582
 
How Today’s Consumers Perceive Tomorrow’s Smart Products 
Serge A. Rijsdijk and Erik Jan Hultink 
ERS-2007-005-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8984
 
Product Intelligence: Its Conceptualization, Measurement and Impact on Consumer Satisfaction 
Serge A. Rijsdijk, Erik Jan Hultink and Adamantios Diamantopoulos 
ERS-2007-006-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8580
 
Testing the Strength of the Iron Cage: A Meta-Analysis of Neo-Institutional Theory 
Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens and Michel Lander 
ERS-2007-007-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8581
 
Export Orientation among New Ventures and Economic Growth 
S. Jolanda A. Hessels and André van Stel 
ERS-2007-008-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8583
 
Allocation and Productivity of Time in New Ventures of Female and Male Entrepreneurs 
Ingrid Verheul, Martin Carree and Roy Thurik 
ERS-2007-009-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8989
 
Cooperating if one’s Goals are Collective-Based: Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal-Transformation 
David De Cremer, Daan van Knippenberg, Eric van Dijk and Esther van Leeuwen 
ERS-2007-010-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9041
 
Unfit to Learn? How Long View Organizations Adapt to Environmental Jolts 
Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens and Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos 
ERS-2007-014-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9404
 
Going, Going, Gone. Innovation and Exit in Manufacturing Firms 
Elena Cefis and Orietta Marsili 
ERS-2007-015-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9732
 
 
 
 
High in the Hierarchy: How Vertical Location and Judgments of Leaders' Power are Interrelated 
Steffen R. Giessner and Thomas W. Schubert 
ERS-2007-021-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9727
 
Contracts to Communities: a Processual Model of Organizational Virtue 
Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, Muel Kaptein and J. van Oosterhout 
ERS-2007-023-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9728
 
Why Are Some Entrepreneurs More Innovative Than Others? 
Philipp Koellinger 
ERS-2007-024-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9730
 
Stimulating Strategically Aligned Behaviour Among Employees 
Cees B. M. van Riel, Guido Berens and Majorie Dijkstra 
ERS-2007-029-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10067  
 
The Effectiveness of Business Codes: A Critical Examination of Existing Studies and the Development of an Integrated 
Research Model 
Muel Kaptein and Mark Schwartz 
ERS-2007-030-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10150  
 
Knowledge Spillovers and Entrepreneurs’ Export Orientation 
Dirk De Clercq, Jolanda Hessels and André van Stel 
ERS-2007-038-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10178  
 
Silicon Valley in the Polder? Entrepreneurial Dynamics, Virtuous Clusters and Vicious Firms in the Netherlands and Flanders 
Willem Hulsink, Harry Bouwman and Tom Elfring 
ERS-2007-048-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10459  
 
An Incomplete Contracting Model of Governance Structure Variety in Franchising 
George Hendrikse and Tao Jiang 
ERS-2007-049-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10462  
 
On the Evolution of Product Portfolio Coherence of Cooperatives versus Corporations: An Agent-Based Analysis of the 
Single Origin Constraint 
George Hendrikse and Ruud Smit 
ERS-2007-055-ORG 
 
 
Greenfield or Acquisition Entry: A Review of the Empirical Foreign Establishment Mode Literature 
Arjen H.L. Slangen and Jean-François Hennart 
ERS-2007-059-ORG 
 
 
Do Multinationals Really Prefer to Enter Culturally-Distant Countries Through Greenfields Rather than Through Acquisitions? 
The Role of Parent Experience and Subsidiary Autonomy 
Arjen H.L. Slangen and Jean-François Hennart 
ERS-2007-060-ORG 
 
 
 
 
 
The Financial Centres of Shanghai and Hong Kong: Competition or Complementarity? 
Bas Karreman and Bert van der Knaap 
ERS-2007-062-ORG 
 
 
Peer Influence in Network Markets: An Empirical Investigation 
Jörn H. Block and Philipp Köllinger 
ERS-2007-063-ORG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
